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The role of government effectiveness in suppressing corruption: Insights from the BRICS emerging economies

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Abstract

This study examines how government effectiveness contributes to suppressing corruption in BRICS countries—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Institutional theory and the theory of good governance frame the investigation into the interaction between government effectiveness, the rule of law, political stability, and economic growth in reducing corruption, addressing a significant research gap in emerging economies. Using panel data from the World Bank spanning from 2000 to 2021, the study employs dynamic panel analysis with the Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model and the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator. While government effectiveness and the rule of law significantly reduce corruption in both the short and long term, political stability exhibits a dual effect: initially aggravating corruption in the short term but reinforcing anti-corruption reforms in the long run. The error correction term is negative and statistically significant, confirming a long-run relationship among our variables, with deviations corrected over approximately three years. The findings emphasize the need for policymakers in emerging economies to enhance institutional quality, strengthen the rule of law, and promote political stability to sustain anti-corruption efforts. While the study focuses on BRICS nations, the insights may be applicable to other emerging economies facing institutional weaknesses. Future research could explore the role of digital governance and cross-country political dynamics in shaping anti-corruption strategies.

Keywords: BRICS, Corruption suppression, Emerging economies, Government effectiveness, Institutional quality.

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1. Introduction

Corruption is especially harmful in developing countries and threatens social fairness, governance, and economic growth. Institutions adjust to the demands of complicated politics and quick development in these situations [1-4]. Corruption weakens legal frameworks, deters foreign investment, and erodes public trust. This leads to inefficient institutions and unnecessary spending. Emerging markets with unstable governments, such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), are rife with corruption. Nonetheless, these nations are uniquely positioned because of their expanding global influence and economic potential. Analyzing how corruption and governance interact in different countries may yield insightful information that helps create anti-corruption laws that work in various political and economic environments.

In recent years, governments have been using governance metrics to combat corruption. They think corruption can be decreased by improving government performance. An efficient government reduces corruption by maintaining consistent policies, avoiding political pressure, and offering top-notch public services [1, 5, 6]. Previous research indicates that effective governance can deter public officials from misusing their authority. However, no study has investigated how government effectiveness affects corruption within the BRICS context [7]. The governance systems of each BRICS country make them ideal for comparison. This study addresses this gap by examining the relationship between government efficacy and corruption control in the BRICS nations, focusing on progress, stability, and the rule of law as moderating factors.

This study aims to expand on previous findings. It will use a dynamic panel analysis to examine how effectively the government has suppressed corruption from 2000 to 2021. This study will use the ARDL model and the PMG estimator. It will detail the immediate and long-term effects of the connection between government efficiency and corruption. The control variables will be GDP growth per capita and political stability. The specific goal of this study is to show how better governance might lessen corruption in the intricate institutions of the BRICS nations.

The BRICS economies are the primary focus of this paper's discussion on governance and corruption. They have governance issues even though they are essential participants on a global level. This study looks at ways to combat corruption while taking the rule of law, political stability, and government effectiveness into account. It offers information to help shape policy in these and other developing markets. The results will demonstrate that better governance can reduce corruption and encourage the development of robust institutions that promote social equity and long-term prosperity.

This document is organized as follows: The literature is reviewed in Section 2, which also discusses past studies on the relationship between government efficacy and corruption. It focuses on how economic variables, political stability, and the rule of law impact anti-corruption efforts. The ideas and hypotheses that guide this investigation are explained in Section 3, along with the key variables examined, the PMG estimator, and the ARDL model selection. A detailed explanation of the data and procedures is given in Section 4, which also covers suppliers, variable measurements, and model needs. The results and analysis are shown in Section 5, which also discusses the short- and long-term effects of corruption and government effectiveness in the BRICS countries. The last section highlights the main conclusions and provides policy recommendations for emerging economies.

2. Literature Review

Corruption control is a complex issue. Several research studies on governance, political stability, and institutions have yielded findings. Reducing corruption requires these studies. The unique features of the BRICS and other rising countries impact initiatives to combat corruption. We must thus comprehend the mechanics of their governance. This review examines how well countries fight corruption and explores the roles of economic growth, political stability, and the rule of law. Studies demonstrating how better governance might reduce corruption are compiled in this area, focusing on poor countries that confront numerous obstacles.

2.1. Government Effectiveness as a Determinant of Corruption Control

Reducing corruption necessitates an effective government. It enhances responsibility, resilience, and transparency [8]. A robust public sector is the outcome of effective governance. It can carry out policies without interference from politics. Preventing the misuse of public resources requires doing this. Ineffective regimes typically have higher levels of official responsibility, which lowers corruption. For instance, systems that place a high priority on public service frequently use internal checks and measures. This enables governments to monitor and assess their operations continuously [5].

Furthermore, good governance promotes bureaucratic independence, which reduces the likelihood of political interference linked to corruption. As a result of this autonomy, public institutions are able to pursue policy goals. Limiting personal advantages also reduces corruption [6, 9, 10].

Corruption control is significantly affected by government performance in growing economies such as the BRICS. Highly effective governments like China utilize e-governance and anti-corruption programs to tackle inefficiencies [11]. China has adopted digital solutions to deliver public services. Consequently, government processes are now more transparent, reducing the likelihood of corruption in resource distribution and public procurement. Conversely, Russia and Brazil encounter challenges in enforcing the effectiveness of their governments due to complex political and administrative factors[12]. Outcomes vary among the BRICS countries, emphasizing the importance of effective governance in the fight against corruption. Even in high-risk areas, corruption can be mitigated by creating organizations that foster transparency [13].

Effective policies are essential. Research indicates that successful anti-corruption initiatives can be achieved through effective governance. For lasting effects, they require additional support. This may only lead to temporary improvements in the fight against corruption [4]. For example, anti-corruption campaigns might be launched by governments with weak institutions. They will lack significant impact if they cannot enforce these regulations. This is evident in countries with

ineffective governments. A lack of funding, inadequate services, and political pressure create vulnerabilities that corrupt individuals can exploit [14]. The BRICS nations exemplify this dynamic. South Africa and Brazil have sought to enhance the efficiency of their governments. However, those reforms are undermined by resource limitations and political instability.

China's anti-corruption agencies have been successful in reducing corruption. This is a result of the government's increased effectiveness. However, an exceptional political climate allows for strict governance. A more efficient government combats corruption and enhances governance. Controlling corruption requires doing this. Public services that are transparent and effective foster trust. They eliminate the need for unofficial networks, which frequently encourage corruption [15]. Governments can better check institutions and enforce the law as they develop. They are also able to implement the law. de Sousa et al. [16] state that these elements deter corruption. An effective government can use both direct and indirect methods to discourage corruption. This demonstrates how important it is to the more significant battle against corruption. These findings emphasize how important it is for the BRICS nations' governments to become more effective. Their diverse backgrounds provide valuable perspectives on mitigating corruption. In intricate political and economic contexts, they advocate for improved governance.

2.2. Rule of Law and Its Role in Corruption Mitigation

A key component of effective governance is the rule of law. It requires low corruption, the protection of rights, and consistent regulations. According to Kaufmann et al. [8], the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives relies on a strong rule of law. It utilizes fair and transparent laws to hold individuals and organizations accountable. Research shows that a weak legal system often leads to higher levels of corruption, allowing individuals to evade enforcement or exploit legal loopholes[10, 17].

There are significant differences in the rule of law among the BRICS nations. South Africa demonstrates a higher degree of legal integrity compared to other countries. Meanwhile, the courts in China and Russia face various issues [18]. India's legal system has improved as a growing economy, but it still struggles with corruption and timely justice [19]. These differences highlight the importance of the rule of law for anti-corruption initiatives within the diverse governance systems of the BRICS countries.

The rule of law prevents corruption. Ensuring that regulations are applied consistently stops individuals from exploiting connections or loopholes to their advantage [19]. In countries where the rule of law is upheld, the judiciary is reliable and independent. It can deter potential wrongdoers by holding even high-ranking officials accountable. Prospective criminals are less likely to act dishonestly if they expect legal consequences [10].

Applying the rule of law among the BRICS nations must have a better balance. Russia and China lack the judicial independence found in Brazil and South Africa. Political interference has harmed the legal system in those countries [20]. For example, Russia has attempted to enhance legal transparency. However, implementing judicial reforms has proven challenging. Consequently, corruption persists despite these efforts [21]. The BRICS nations illustrate how anti-corruption measures and the rule of law affect initiatives. Corruption is more effectively addressed in countries with strong legal systems and independent courts. Weaker legal systems may require assistance to achieve similar outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to strengthen the rule of law. Creating an environment favorable to the success of anti-corruption initiatives is essential, especially given the complex governance structures within the BRICS countries.

2.3. Political Stability and Its Influence on Corruption Suppression

Political stability is another essential element in the fight against corruption, significantly impacting the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. Studies show that political stability helps governments combat corruption by enabling them to implement long-term policies without political obstacles [4, 22]. In times of turbulence, a stable political climate enhances resilience and reduces corruption [23].

The BRICS nations' levels of political stability differ significantly from one another. China is stable because of its organized political structure. On the other hand, political unpredictability in South Africa and Brazil frequently impedes anti-corruption initiatives [24]. For example, political shifts in Brazil have occasionally resulted in policy changes that have undermined previous anti-corruption achievements. According to Kaufmann et al. [8], stability is essential for long-lasting governance improvements. Stability and corruption control must be linked. It aids in our comprehension of the BRICS nations' governance issues.

2.4. Economic Growth and Corruption in Emerging Markets

Controlling corruption in emerging economies is influenced by economic growth in two main ways. Growth can potentially increase funding for anti-corruption initiatives. It may hold the public sector accountable and bolster institutions [25]. However, rent-seeking behavior may also increase due to rapid economic expansion. Olken and Pande [26]. This is especially true in industries with loose regulations. Research on the BRICS nations indicates that governance has improved due to growth, but it has also significantly strained institutions. The complexity of economies and possible collusion between the private and public sectors contribute to this [27].

The BRICS nations face challenges [28]. They must balance effective governance with economic prosperity. For instance, China's rapid development required changes to curb corruption. In Russia, lax regulations have contributed to a rise in corruption due to monetary expansion. The connection between growth and corruption highlights the urgent need for anti-corruption measures, which should be tailored to the unique institutional and financial contexts of the BRICS nations.

According to the literature, fighting corruption in developing countries like the BRICS requires political stability, economic growth, the rule of law, and effective governance. Transparency and accountability are increased through efficient

governance. Fair enforcement is guaranteed by the rule of law, which reduces corruption. Political stability and economic expansion impact anti-corruption campaigns. The distinct economic and governance features of each BRICS nation shape these dynamics. Even though these factors have been thoroughly researched, a comprehensive analysis is still required. It ought to investigate their effects on and relationships with corruption in the BRICS nations. The purpose of this study is to close this gap. Focusing on stable politics and the rule of law, it will examine the connection between improved governance and the fight against corruption. The results are anticipated to shed light on governance reforms in developing markets to strengthen anti-corruption strategies for these heterogeneous economies.

3. Theoretical Framework

Institutional theory serves as the foundation for our investigation. According to this theory, corruption, governance, and economic outcomes are all influenced by the structure and quality of institutions [29]. According to institutional theory, corruption stems from inefficient, inconsistent, or unenforced institutions that permit public employees to take advantage of their positions for private benefit. Strong institutions, on the other hand, promote transparency, predictability, and accountability—all of which are essential for thwarting corruption. According to institutional theory, the BRICS countries' efforts to combat corruption are greatly aided by political stability, the rule of law, and efficient government. The institutions of the BRICS countries will be of higher quality if governance and law enforcement are improved. As a result, corruption will decline, and growth and equity will be encouraged.

This study also employs the theory of good governance. It links social progress and sustainable development to the quality of government. According to Kaufmann et al. [21], the foundations of good governance consist of political stability, the rule of law, and an efficient government. The theory emphasizes the importance of institutions that provide services, uphold law and order, and fight against corruption. The argument posits that strengthening these pillars can help reduce corruption. In the BRICS nations, this would enhance transparency and accountability. There are significant differences between their economic pressures and governance. The argument states that effective governments reduce corruption by 1. implementing policies, 2. ensuring law enforcement is impartial and consistent, and 3. providing stability for anti-corruption reforms.

In this paper, these relationships are investigated using a Panel ARDL model. It is a decent tool for examining dynamic panel data's short- and long-term effects. The ARDL model examines how changes in four aspects of corruption economic development, political stability, the rule of law, and government efficiency affect corruption over the long run. It draws attention to how corruption endures despite governmental changes. This paradigm uses the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator, which captures the obvious, immediate, and long-term relationships between governance quality and corruption. This method allows for evaluating how soon the BRICS countries achieve equilibrium after making institutional improvements. It illustrates how governance elements affect corruption in emerging economies, bolstering the Institutional and Good Governance Theory. These elements interact with one another throughout time.

The framework of this study links institutional theory and conceptions of good governance. It explains how institutional quality affects corruption while highlighting stability, legal systems, and government efficacy. These ideas suggest that improved governance can lessen corruption in the BRICS countries. Additionally, strong institutions demonstrate how to fight corruption and advance fair growth. These related theories will be the focus of the investigation. It seeks to promote policies that fortify anti-corruption organizations and advance knowledge of corruption and governance in developing nations.

4. Data and Methodology

4.1. The Data

This study utilized secondary panel data from the World Bank databases, covering the BRICS nations from 2000 to 2021. The study used the control of corruption index (*corr*) as the dependent variable, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, along with government effectiveness (*gov_eff*), rule of law (*rol*), political stability (*ps*), and GDP per capita growth (*cpta_grth*) as independent variables. The World Bank's definitions of these variables are provided in Table 1.

Table 1.
Variables, abbreviations, definitions, and measurement.

Variable	Abbreviation	Definition	Measurement
Control of corruption	*corr*	Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. The estimate provides the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.	From −2.5 (highly unobserved, OR immensely corrupt) to 2.5 (highly observed, OR very clean)
Government Effectiveness	*gov_eff*	Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.	From −2.5 (highly unobserved) to 2.5 (highly observed)
Rule of Law	*rol*	Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.	From −2.5 (highly unobserved) to 2.5 (highly observed)
Political Stability	*ps*	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. The estimate gives the country's score on the aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5.	From −2.5 (highly unobserved) to 2.5 (highly observed)
GDP per capita growth	*cpta_grth*	The annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita is based on constant local currency. GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without deductions for the depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources.	(annual%)

Countries are ranked to develop the World Governance Indicators (WGI) based on perceptions of public sector corruption in developed and developing nations and the quality of governance assessed by organizations, citizens, and experts. A country's score is compared to others in the aggregate indicator, where 2.5 indicates the highest rank (very clean) and -2.5 signifies the lowest (very corrupt).

Figure 1 shows the evolution of government effectiveness by using the government effectiveness index in BRICS countries (2000-20201). The figure shows different and fluctuating government effectiveness trends in these countries. However, China achieved remarkable improvement in government effectiveness, especially after 2013 compared to previous years, implying that the quality of public and civil services, the quality of policy, and the credibility of the government's commitment had improved; after China, this improvement followed by India and Russia to some extent. Meanwhile, government effectiveness in South Africa and Brazil deteriorated during the study period.



Figure 1.
Government effectiveness index in BRICS countries (2000–2021).

Figure 2 illustrates the development of anti-corruption practices in BRICS countries, using the Control of Corruption Index (CCI) during the study period. The figure displays various fluctuating trends of anti-corruption practices in these nations. As shown in the figure, South Africa achieved the highest score with a mean of 0.124, followed closely by Brazil at -0.166. While still exhibiting a low mean score of -0.384, China demonstrated notable improvement after 2005 compared to the previous period; this advancement can be attributed to the anti-corruption measures adopted by the Chinese government within the framework of China's economic and social reform [30]. Among BRICS countries, Russia stands out as the most corrupt, with a mean index value of -0.944, suggesting that the perception of control over corruption is significantly low despite slight improvements over the last decade, followed by India.



Figure 2.
Control of corruption (anti-corruption) index in BRICS countries.

Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between government effectiveness and anti-corruption practices in BRICS countries. It concludes that there is a positive correlation between both variables in all countries, but particularly in South Africa and Brazil. This implies that an improvement in government effectiveness eradicates corruption practices in these countries, which is consistent with the findings of other studies [8].



Figure 3.
Government effectiveness and anti-corruption practices in BRICS countries.

4.2. The Model

The relationship between government effectiveness and corruption suppression can be analyzed using the Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Model. Baltagi and Baltagi [31] argue that panel data analysis reduces multicollinearity among explanatory variables and allows for the examination of a large number of heterogeneous observations. The model can be represented as.

$$y_{it} = \emptyset_i + \sum_{j=1}^{k} \boldsymbol{\sigma}_j \boldsymbol{X}_{it} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

Where y_{it} is the control of corruption index (*corr*) of the country (*i*) the rule of law (*rol*), political stability (*ps*), and the growth of real GDP per capita (*cpta_grth*). The two vectors $\emptyset_i$ and $\boldsymbol{\sigma_j}$ represent country-specific fixed effects, and the regression parameters that estimate the impact of *j* regressors, respectively. ϵ_{it} are the error term. The compact form of ARDL can be derived from Equation 1.

$$y_{it} = \mu_i + \sum_{j=1}^{m} \gamma_{ij}\, y_{it-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{n} \rho_{ij} X_{it-j} + \epsilon_{it} \quad (2)$$

Where μ_i denotes the country-specific unobservables, optimal lag lengths m and n are determined using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and are not necessarily equal across variables. Equation 2 has a re-parametrization form in the "Conditional Error Correction Model" as follows.

$$\Delta y_{it} = \varphi_i + \sum_{j=1}^{p-1} \alpha_{ij} \Delta y_{i,t-j} + \sum_{j=0}^{q-1} \beta'_{ij} \Delta \boldsymbol{X}_{i,t-j} + \vartheta_i \left(y_{i,t-1} - \delta'_i \boldsymbol{X}_{i,t-1}\right) + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (3)$$

The error correction term $\left(y_{i,t-1} - \delta'_i \boldsymbol{X}_{i,t-1}\right)$ represents one lag residual from the regression of the set of independent variables, while the error-correction term ϑ_i measures the speed of adjustment toward equilibrium, δ_i measures of the long-run parameters, while α and β are the short-run dynamic coefficients. The pooled mean group (PMG) estimator can be used to estimate the model. Pesaran et al. [32] have shown that the flexibility of the PMG estimator makes it superior. So, suppose we allow heterogeneity in the intercept, short-run parameters, and error terms while constraining long-run cross-country parameters to homogeneity. In that case, we may construct a homogeneous, long-run, cross-country government-corruption relationship.

5. The Empirical Results

5.1. Testing for Unit Root and Cointegration

Table 2 displays the outcomes of panel unit root tests that checked for data stationarity. According to the results of the IPS Im et al. [33] and LLC Levin et al. [34] tests, per-capita GDP growth is stationary at a level. In contrast, government

efficiency, the rule of law, and political stability are stationary at first differences. Kao test rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration, demonstrating that our variables have a long-term cointegration relationship.

Table 2.
Unit Root Tests and Kao Cointegration Test.

Variables		**inv**	**cpta_grth**	**ms**	**r**	**corr**
IPS	Chi-square	– 4.4915	– 5.2852	– 4.1537	– 5.0314	– 3.2855
	Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002
	Stationary	1st Difference	1st Difference	1st Difference	1st Difference	level
LLC	t-statistic	– 3.9590	– 4.2855	– 3.8291	– 4.8675	– 1.9860
	Probability	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001	0.0000	0.0235
	Stationary	1stDifference*	1stDifference*	1stDifference*	1stDifference*	level
Cointegration	Kao Cointegration Test		ADF	t-statistic	Prob.	
Test	H0: No cointegration			– 4.0363	0.000	

5.2. Multicollinearity Test

The results of the linear correlation test among our variables are shown in Table 3. Findings indicate no linear association between the variables and no multicollinearity concerns.

Table 3.
Multicollinearity test.

variable	***gov_eff***	***rol***	***ps***	***cpta_grth***
gov_eff	1.000			
rol	0.485	1.000		
ps	0.434	0.262	1.000	
cpta_grth	– 0.004	– 0.238	– 0.261	1.000

5.3. ARDL Results

The Pooled Mean Group estimator was employed to assess the effects of government effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, and per capita GDP growth on corruption suppression within the BRICS group. The results are presented in Table 4 below.

In line with expectations and previous research findings, despite differing methodologies, government effectiveness has a positive and statistically significant influence on reducing corruption in both the short term and long term. Similarly, the rule of law has a positive and significant impact on the suppression of corruption in both the short run and the long run. Furthermore, while economic growth and political stability both exert long-term positive effects on corruption, the impact of political stability is negative in the short term, indicating that increasing political instability has an immediate detrimental effect on efforts to combat corruption.

In conclusion, rising political instability increases corruption in the short term while encouraging anti-corruption measures in the long run. Economic growth, the rule of law, and government effectiveness all reduce corruption. Finally, the error correction term is negative in sign and statistically significant, confirming the long-run cointegrating relationship among our variables. This result indicates that the BRICS economies correct their deviation from the equilibrium level of corruption within three years.

Table 4.
Panel ARDL – PMG Estimator Results.

Panel Variable (*i*): country			**Number of obs = 105**		
Time Variable (*t*): year			**Number of groups = 5**		
			Obs per group: min = 21		
			avg = 21.0		
			max = 21		
			Log Likelihood = 148.5009		
Δ corr		***Coef.***	***Std.Err.***	***z-stat***	***p-value***
	ECT	– 0.3356**	0.1523	– 2.20	0.028
Long run	*gov_eff*	2.272***	0.071	3.85	0.000
	rol	0.530***	0.080	6.62	0.000
	ps	0.329***	0.058	5.66	0.000
	cpta_grth	0.009***	0.003	2.93	0.003
Short run	*Δ gov_eff*	0.116	0.096	1.22	0.224
	Δ rol	0.232***	0.087	2.66	0.008
	Δ ps	– 0.1505**	0.065	– 2.31	0.021
	Δ cpta_grth	– 0.001	0.003	– 0.51	0.609
	Constant	– 0.031**	0.015	– 2.01	0.044

6. Conclusion

This study investigates the relationship between corruption and government efficacy in the BRICS countries. It concludes that strong adherence to the rule of law, political stability, sufficient economic growth, and excellent governance are all necessary to combat corruption. The results verify that corruption is reduced by efficient government. It is characterized by an open public service that is free from political influence. Both the short-term and long-term effects are observed. The importance of the rule of law in maintaining accountability is also emphasized in the study. Anti-corruption measures are more successfully implemented in nations with robust legal systems and independent tribunals. By offering continuity, political stability aids in the implementation of governance reforms. However, if instability arises, it may lead to complicated problems.

This research utilizes the ARDL model and PMG estimator for dynamic analysis. It illustrates how several aspects of governance interact in complex ways among the BRICS countries. Several political and economic settings influence anti-corruption results. The report highlights China's achievements in anti-corruption and governance efforts. It suggests that a more efficient administration can decrease corruption. Because of their resources and complicated political environments, nations like Brazil and Russia face more difficult obstacles. This emphasizes the need for realistic governance enhancements tailored to specific contexts.

These observations have important policy ramifications for developing nations outside of the BRICS. They suggest that to fight corruption, we need to improve governance, laws, and institutions. Emerging economies face particular difficulties in development and governance. A dedication to better governance can reduce the risk of corruption and promote growth. This study makes understanding governance and anti-corruption efforts in complex situations easier. It establishes the framework for upcoming studies on specific reforms in comparable economies.

Future studies could examine digital governance solutions, such as data transparency platforms and e-governance, which could improve government efficiency and reduce corruption in rapidly developing nations. Studies could also investigate the political and cultural elements affecting governance reforms and compare how these elements function in various institutions. Examining the connection between political stability and the quality of governance would be another important line of inquiry. Our goal is to understand how short-term political upheavals affect long-term anti-corruption initiatives. Broader insights could be obtained by expanding the focus to include emerging economies outside of the BRICS, thereby revealing governance approaches that adapt to different political and economic environments.

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